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Criminal Procedure: Entrapment Rationale
Employed to Condemn Government's

Furnishing of Contraband
Angel Luis Oquendo had sold heroin to a federal undercover
agent on three occasions, At trial, despite his admitted willingness to deal in narcotics, he sought to raise an entrapment defense.1 Claiming to be an addict, Oquendo asserted that a contingent-fee informer 2 had supplied him with heroin, promising to
help support his addiction if he would sell the drugs to the federal agent without divulging their source.3 The prosecution pro4
duced the informer, who denied furnishing Oquendo with drugs.
Rejecting his entrapment defense, the jury found Oquendo guilty
on three counts of distribution of heroin in violation of federal
lawY The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed for
1. Oquendo "admitted all of the elements of the crime charged."
United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1974). Furthermore, at trial, Oquendo admitted he had willingly distributed heroin on
other occasions. Brief for Appellee at 8. He based his defense essentially on United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973), which held that a person cannot be prosecuted
for possession or sale of narcotics furnished to him by a government
agent or informer.
2. A "contingent-fee informer" is an unofficial undercover agent
who is paid only if he succeeds in "making" a case. See, e.g., United
States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The terms of informers' agreements with the government vary, and payment does not necessarily depend upon a conviction. In Oquendo, the informer was paid
$100 for arranging a sale of heroin to an agent of the Federal Drug Abuse
Law Enforcement Agency and a further $50 for a second sale. Brief
for Appellant at 5, 6.
3. Brief for Appellant at 6, 7.
4. 490 F.2d at 162. Had the prosecution refused to produce the
informer to contradict Oquendo's allegation, Oquendo would have been
entitled to an acquittal-a procedural rule unique at this time to the
Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); cf. United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d
929, 932 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974). The Supreme
Court has held that where an informer does not testify, the case may
nonetheless reach the jury, which is entitled to disbelieve the defendant's
unrebutted allegations even if they establish a prima facie case of entrapment. Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958). But cf. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (requiring disclosure of an
informer's identity where his testimony is relevant and helpful to the
accused's defense, or, alternatively, requiring dismissal of the action).
The majority of the circuits follow Masciale with respect to the jury
issue. See, e.g., United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078 (1st Cir. 1974);
United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hayes, 477 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1973).
5. Oquendo was convicted of violating section 401 (a) of the Coin-
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error in the jury charge,0 holding that regardless of a person's
willingness to sell drugs, he cannot be convicted of the possession
or sale of narcotics furnished to him by a government informer.
United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).7
Each time the Supreme Court has considered the entrapment
defense, the Justices have sharply divided, in support of two theo.
ries concerning its legal foundation, policy goals, and ultimate
focus.8 In Sorrells v. United States9 and Sherman v. United
States,'0 Chief Justices Hughes and Warren respectively spoke
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) (1970).
6. The sole question in dispute was whether the informer had supplied Oquendo with the heroin he sold to the undercover agent. With
respect to this question, two members of the court found that the jury
charge had been framed as a mere credibility choice between the informer and the defendant, thus impermissibly relaxing the prosecution's
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 490 F.2d at 165. See United
States v. Womack, 454 F.2d 1337, 1337-44 (5th Cir. 1972) (disapproving
statements within the charge to the jury which "[s]tanding alone ...
could be interpreted ... as a directed verdict of guilty").
The third member of the court concurred in the reversal, 490 F.2d
at 166, agreeing that the jury charge prejudiced the defendant; however,
he would not have preserved a Bueno instruction on remand, reasoning
that a defense based solely on the source of the heroin, see note 1 supra,
was rendered untenable by United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
7. The Fifth Circuit unanimously reiterated this holding in United
States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974). But cf. United States
v. Workopovich, 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973) (entrapment not established as a matter of law where the government supplied funds for the
purchase of contraband to a predisposed defendant).
8. See generally United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932); Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal
Courts, and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. Cnm . L.C. & P.S. 447
(1959); Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did
Eat, 1973 U. ILm. L.F. 254; Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the
Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement: Lewis v. United States and Beyond,
4 HousTox L. Ray. 609 (1967); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment
and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FoREDAm L. Rsv. 399
(1959).
9. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Sorrells, a federal prohibition agent
posing as a tourist engaged the defendant in conversation about their
mutual war experiences. After gaining defendant's confidence, the agent
repeatedly requested liquor, persuading the reluctant defendant to procure for him one-half gallon of whiskey. Id. at 439-40. The defendant's
conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held, as a matter
of construction of the National Prohibition Act, that because he was not
predisposed to deal in liquor, he was entitled to the defense of entrapment. Id. at 448.
10. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). In Sherman, the defendant and a government informer, both narcotics addicts, became acquainted during visits
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for majorities of but five members of the Court; in each case
the majority based the entrapment defense on the narrow rationale that Congress could not have intended that its statutes be
construed to permit prosecution of an "otherwise innocent" person whose criminal act was "created" by police instigation."
According to this theory, an entrapment occurs when a criminal
act is performed, but
the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order ... [to] prosecute.' 2

Not all government inducements result in entrapment, however.
The majority's approach permits the police to encourage one
who is "awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the offense,"' 3 on the rationale that exposure of certain crimes requires
the police to provide suspects with "opportunities or facilities"' 1
necessary to their accomplishment. Thus, the majority's approach
distinguishes entrapment from permissible police inducement ac.
cording to the defendant's predisposition. 15 This "subjective"' 6
issue determines guilt or innocence and is, therefore, appropriate7
ly resolved by the trier of fact.'
to a doctor for treatment. In response to the informer's persistent complaints of suffering and requests for a source of narcotics, defendant
eventually submitted and obtained a supply, which he shared with the
informer. Id. at 371. Finding that Sherman was not predisposed to
commit the crime charged, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the entrapment
defense articulated by the Sorrells majority. Id. at 372-73.
11. This theory of statutory construction was originally articulated
by Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448.
12. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (emphasis
added). This passage was quoted by the Supreme Court in both Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372, and United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 43435 (1973).
13. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952)
(L. Hand, J.), rev'd, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
14. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973), quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
15. Chief Justice Warren articulated this distinction, stating: "To
determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be
drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)
(emphasis added).
16.

The predisposition test is subjective in that the ultimate ques-

tion concerns the defendant's state of mind, i.e., his readiness and willingness to commit the offense, rather than his behavior or that of the
investigating agents.

See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440

(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. RPv. 1333
(1960).
17. See e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973),
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A minority of the Supreme Court, on the other hand, has
repeatedly urged recognition of an entrapment defense based on
the proposition that judicial condonation of improper police practices is contrary to public policy.'
In Sherman, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for four concurring Justices, argued that the judiciary should rely on its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts as a basis for scrutinizing and assuring proper standards of police conduct regardless of a defendant's predisposition. 19 He reasoned that jury verdicts are of limited precedential value, maintaining that "significant guidance for official conduct for the future ...
[can
be provided by] [o]nly the court" and envisioning a "gradual
evolution of explicit standards in accumulated precedents ....
With its primary goal the guiding of police behavior, the minority interpreted the courts' supervisory power broadly and suggested an "objective" test 2' for entrapment: if the police are
shown to have employed methods likely to instigate commission
18. See authorities cited in note 8 supra.
19. 356 U.S. 378, 380-81 (Frankfurter, I., concurring, joined by
Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, JJ.). In the words of the Sherman minority:
The crucial question ...

to which the court must direct itself

is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case
falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for
the proper use of government power.
Id. at 382.
20. Id. at 385.
21. Justice Frankfurter argued that his was "as objective a test as
the subject matter permits.

..

."

Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384. As an as-

sessment of a hypothetical person's likely response to the government's
attempts to induce commission of a crime, Frankfurter's approach is "objective" in a traditional sense. Those lower courts that have adopted
a "government conduct" basis for entrapment have not strictly applied
the Frankfurter test, however. In United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671
(9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held certain police conduct to be an "intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." Id. at 673 (emphasis added). Thus, the Ninth Circuit's standard
for assessing police conduct, unlike Frankfurter's, allowed for "subjective" value judgments by trial judges, and this factor especially appears
to have troubled the majority of the Russell Court. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, regarded the Ninth Circuit's standard as "unmanageabl[e]." 411 U.S. at 435.
Entrapment defenses which focus without explanation on "tolerability" or "degree" of government conduct involve considerable subjectivity
in application-more so than Frankfurter apparently had in mind in
Sherman. However, a per se rule against furnishing contraband, such
as that propounded in Oquendo, would not allow for subjectivity in its
application. By definition, it would bar all prosecutions founded on such
government conduct.
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of a crime by a person who normally would have resisted, the
minority would acquit even a predisposed defendant.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Russell,22 most lower federal courts followed the Sorrells-Sherman

majority position by limiting the availability of the entrapment
defense to "otherwise innocent" persons. Several, however, focused on the propriety of police practices without regard to a
particular defendant's criminal inclinations. 23 With varying degrees of explicitness, these courts reasoned that the law of entrapment was uncertain, 24 and based their approaches on the minority rationale. Two lines of "government conduct" cases
emerged. In one, the courts "objectively" assessed the general
25
nature of police involvement under several different standards.
These cases culminated in Greene v. United States, 20 where the
22. 411U.S. 423 (1973).

23. See United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd
411 U.S. 423 (1973); United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.
1972), vacated and remanded for reconsiderationin light of Russell, 412
U.S. 936 (1973); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Morrison, 348 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
905 (1965); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970); United
States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. United States v.
Arceneaux, 437 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1971); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d
370 (1st Cir. 1967); Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir. 1963);
Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1958); Banks v. United
States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957); Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993
(5th Cir. 1933).
24. Three reasons were advanced for this proposition. First, Sorrells and Sherman were "easy" cases involving a classic inducement of
an "otherwise innocent" person. See, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 468
F.2d 1027, 1028 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Russell, 412 U.S. 936 (1973). Second, the Sherman court
did not confront the policy issues underlying the defense, finding this
unnecessary because the defendant was not predisposed and did not argue the minority view. Id. at 1031. Third, shortly after Sherman, the
majority of the Supreme Court considered both approaches before rejecting petitioner's argument in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963),
suggesting that the matter -was unresolved. Id. See generally Recent
Developments, Predispositionof Defendant Crucial Factorin Entrapment
Defense, 59 COaNELL L. REV. 546 (1974); Note, Elevation of Entrapment
to a ConstitutionalDefense, 7 U. MicH. J.L. REFOR 361 (1974).
25. Compare, e.g., United States v. Arceneaux, 437 F.2d 924, 925 (9th
Cir. 1971) ("unbecoming conduct"), with United States v. Morrison, 348
F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1965) ("reasonably decent civilized standards
for the proper use of government power"); Whiting v. United States,
321 F.2d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 1963) ("shocking or offensive per se"); and with
Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) ("fair and
lawful conduct from federal agents"). See generally, Recent Developments, supra note 24, at 562-63; Note, supra note 24, at 371-78.
26. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). The Government involvement in
Greene lasted for more than two and one-half years. After defendants
had been once convicted of bootlegging charges, sentenced, and paroled,
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the police involvement as so "enmeshed" in the criminal enterprise as to render prosecution "repugnant to American criminal justice. 2 7' In
a second line of cases, federal courts condemned specific police
practices. One such case, United States v. Bueno,28 established
direct precedent for Oquendo; there, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit barred appellant's prosecution solely because
he had received the heroin at issue from a government agent.
The Bueno and Greene lines of cases appeared to merge in United States v. Russell,20 where a government agent provided defendants with a scarce and essential ingredient for the illegal
manufacture of methamphetamine. Relying alternatively on
both Greene and Bueno, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Russell's conviction, holding that this conduct manifested an "intolerable degree of governmental participation in
30
the criminal enterprise."
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and reversed the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit, holding that the conviction was
permissible because Russell was predisposed to commit the
crime.3 1 It thereby expressly reaffirmed the position of the majority of the Court in Sorrells and Sherman.32 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the five-member majority in Russell, charac.
terized entrapment as a "relatively limited defense" and sharply
criticized those federal courts which, following the minority position, had barred prosecutions on the basis of what they determined to be "overzealous law enforcement practices":
a government agent urged them to resume production. Acting as their
only customer, he offered to provide them with equipment and a still
operator, and supplied them with 2000 pounds of sugar at wholesale
prices. Id. at 784-86.
27. Id. at 787.
28. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973).
The salient facts in Bueno were identical to those in Oquendo: a contingent-fee informer had furnished heroin to an addict for resale to a
government agent. An earlier federal case supporting this line of development was United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
(government provision of counterfeit bills bars prosecution of defendant
for possession of those bills with intent to pass as genuine, even though
defendant initiated the contact). Cf. United States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp.
980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), discussed in note 56 infra.
29. 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
30. Id. at 673.
31. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
32. Id. at 433. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and
Blacknun joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court. The Sotr'ells-Shermanminority views were urged in the dissent of Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, id. at 436, and in that of Justice Stewart,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 439.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:444

Several decisions of the United States district courts and courts
of appeals have undoubtedly gone beyond this Court's opinion
in Sorrells and Sherman .... [T] he defense of entrapment...
was not intended to give the federal judiciary a "chancellor's
foot" veto
over law enforcement practices of which it did not
33
approve.
Despite the Russell Court's strong reiteration of congressional intent as the basis for a narrow entrapment defense, the
Oquendo Court implicitly based its entrapment holding on the
supervisory power of the courts.3 4 Finding that the govern33. Id. at 435.
34. A "supervisory power" basis of Oquendo is revealed by the
court's reliance on Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.
1962), in which the Fifth Circuit barred prosecution of a defendant under
an entrapment theory based on the rationale of McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
In those cases, the Supreme Court had interpreted specific federal statutes or rules as requiring that it exercise a supervisory power to assure
"proper standards for the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the
federal courts." McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341. The effect of the Court's action in these cases was to condemn out-of-court conduct by the police.
Thus, in McNabb, the Court determined that the police had violated a
federal statute (now FED. R. Clum. P. 5 (a)) which requires arraignment
with reasonable promptness, and concluded that the appropriate remedy
for this violation was exclusion of the confessions thereby obtained. Id.
at 342-47. Similarly, the Mallory Court disallowed a confession obtained
from the defendant while he was detained in violation of FED. R. CaMu.
P. 5 (a).
In several cases, Justice Frankfurter urged expansion of this supervisory role of the courts. Dissenting in another context in On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952), and concurring in Sherman, he
urged that the federal courts refuse to countenance abusive police measures, whether or not the police had violated constitutional or statutory
provisions. However, the majority of the Supreme Court has never relied solely on an unrestrained power to determine that the out-of-court
conduct of a federal agent is unlawful; such determinations have rested
on an independent basis, as in McNabb and Mallory. See also Upshaw
v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) (violation of Rule 5 (a)); United
States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1944) ("Our duty in shaping rules
of evidence relates to the propriety of admitting evidence. This power
is not to be used as an indirect mode of disciplining misconduct."). See
generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLum.
L. REv.181 (1969).
Several commentators have explained McNabb and Mallory on the
theory that the exercise of power over the admissibility of evidence is
traditionally a judicial function, but have argued that a judicially-created bar to prosecution based solely on a finding of reprehensible police
conduct would constitute an unwarranted restraint on executive prerogatives. Id. at 214; Comment, Limitation on Undercover Police Activity,
87 HARv. L. REv. 243, 249 n.47 (1973). The majority of the Supreme
Court would likely be in accord and would probably regard the supervisory approach to entrapment, as it is employed in Oquendo, an infringement on the separation of powers. In Russell, for example, Justice
Rehnquist noted for the Court that "[agent] Shapiro [did not] violate
any federal statute or rule or commit any crime in infiltrating the re-
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ment's provision of contraband exceeded the "bounds of reason,"
the Fifth Circuit espoused a broad per se rule barring this practice regardless of the defendant's criminal inclinations.3 5 As a
per se rule, the decision of the Oquendo Court represents a fulfillment of Justice Frankfurter's vision in that it sets a clear
precedent to guide police behavior. On the other hand, as a per
se rule it cannot be readily reconciled with the Russell Court's
reaffirmance of the predisposition test. By focusing on predisposition, the Supreme Court would permit a "furnishing contraband" defense only to an "otherwise innocent" person, and not
to Oquendo.
Apparently recognizing this problem, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit attempted to reconcile its holding with Russell in several ways. First, the court quoted language used in
both the Sorrells and Sherman majority opinions to the effect
that "the sales of heroin were made through the creative activity
of the government"; 36 thus they could be held to constitute entrapment under the majority rationale. This attempt to align
the two cases is clearly unsatisfactory, however, because from
the majority's perspective "creative activity" is conclusory language. "Creative activity" refers not only to the government's
role in perpetrating the particular crime, but also necessarily to
the government's creation of the defendant's criminal designs in
spondent's drug enterprise." 411 US. at 430.
Congress has for some time had before it several bills to codify the
entrapment defense as part of a general revision of the Federal Criminal
Code. See, e.g., S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 531 (1973) (Nixon administration proposal); S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-3B-2 (1973); Hearings
on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1971) (§ 702 of Study Commission draft). Specific
entrapment legislation could clearly serve as a foundation for the exercise of a supervisory power. Notwithstanding the absence of such legislation, however, the court could have used existing criminal legislation

to bar prosecution under its supervisory power. In stating without ex-

planation that government agent Shapiro did not violate existing law,

Russell assumes its conclusion. Had the agent not been acting for the

purpose of catching Russell and his codefendants, his activities would
seem clearly to have violated the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1970). Thus, if the agent's conduct was not unlawful, it was because the Court determined that the conspiracy statute contains an implied exception for conspiracies engaged in for purposes such as agent
Shapiro's. That determination, of course, was precisely the broader issue before the Court in Russell, but the Court never explicitly faced it.
See 411 U.S. at 427-36.

35. 490 F.2d at 163.

36. 490 F.2d at 164 (emphasis in original), quoting United States

v. Bueno, 447 F.2d at 903, 905 (1971). The reference to "creative activity"
also appears in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372, and Sorrells, 387 U.S. at 451.
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the first instance.3 7
Second, the court attempted to reduce the import of Russell
by restricting that decision to its facts. There, the court observed, the government had provided defendants with merely an
ingredient for the manufacture of methamphetamine, while in
Oquendo the government had provided actual contraband. This
distinction appears to turn at least in part on the degree of
the defendant's participation: Russell had to complete the manufacture of a controlled substance, but Oquendo had only to deliver contraband to the arresting agent. Oquendo's role, therefore, was merely that of a conduit and, in the words of the Fifth
Circuit,
[t]he story takes on the element of the government buying
heroin from itself, through an intermediary
the defendant, and
then charging him with the crime.38

On the basis of this characterization, the court concluded that
a finding of entrapment where the government furnishes actual
contraband was not inconsistent with Russell, regardless of the
3 9

defendant's predisposition.

The Supreme Court did not likely intend, however, that the
lower courts so narrowly regard its third major consideration of
the entrapment defense. Ascribing less significance to the
specific facts of Russell, a number of recent decisions and commentators have interpreted that case broadly, reasoning that the
37. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435; Note, supra note
16, at 1335.
38. 490 F.2d at 163 (emphasis in original), quoting United States
v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 905 (1971).
The Fifth Circuit has refused to extend an Oquendo defense to a
defendant who cannot be characterized as a conduit. Thus, the rule
against furnishing contraband does not protect all persons in a "chain."
In United States v. Rodriguez, 474 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the conviction of a defendant whose brother was furnished cocaine by an informer, stating that "Bueno will not support
the theory that the introduction of narcotics into the marketplace by the
Government informer is sufficient to cloak all subsequent sellers with
an entrapment defense." Id. at 589. Since the government's act of providing contraband is precisely the same in Rodriguez and Oquendo, the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning appears to lack theoretical consistency. However, Bueno imposed on the government the burden of proving that the
contraband was not furnished by the informer. See note 4 supra. Were
the government required to prove such a negative proposition by tracing
all stages of the chain of supply, its burden would be virtually impossible to meet. Thus, Rodriguez appears a necessary exercise in linedrawing, although some consistency is sacrificed.
39. 490 F.2d at 164. The Russell Court did indicate that Russell
was not a contraband case, but did so in its discussion and rejection of
due process as a foundation for Russell's defense, not in its discussion
of entrapment. 411 U.S. at 432. See note 66 infra.
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Supreme Court meant its rejection of the minority rationale to
foreclose the availability of entrapment defenses founded simply
on government conduct. 40 The Court may have reinforced these
broad interpretations with its decision to vacate the judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. McGrath.41 There, the counterfeiting conviction of an admittedly predisposed defendant had been overturned because the
government had assumed control over the printing and manufac42
ture of the bills, ultimately delivering them to the defendant.
Although McGrath thus appears to have involved government
provision of actual contraband, 43 the Fifth Circuit merely regarded the Supreme Court's handling of that case as "cryptic,"
choosing to ignore it, rather than attempting to distinguish it
44
from Oquendo.
The "conduit" characterization of the Fifth Circuit may be
appealing; unelaborated, 'however, it falls short of reconciling
Oquendo with Russell and McGrath. It is thus especially disappointing that the court failed to explain its judgment-that
furnishing actual contraband exceeds the "bounds of reason"-by elaborating on the essential policy considerations underlying
the entrapment defense. In this respect, two generalized posi40. See, e.g., United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1081 (1st Cir. 1974)
("We do not accept Bueno"); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213,
1223 (2d Cir. 1973) (Russell renders untenable the argument that furnishing "the means for the commission of the crime" constitutes entrapment); United States v. Johnson, 484 F.2d 165, 167 (9th Cir. 1973) (Russell rejects entrapment based on "impermissible degree of government
participation"); United States v. Hayes, 477 F.2d 868, 873 (10th Cir. 1973)
(Russell "rejected reasoning similar to that found in. .. Bueno") (dictum). See also R. Park, Drug Crimes: Cases and Materials XIV-XVI
(Jan. 1974 ed.) (unpublished course materials on file in the University
of Minnesota Law Library); Recent Developments, supra note 24; Note,
supra note 24; Comment, supra note 34.
However, each of these commentators argued that although the
Court had rejected the minority approach to entrapment, it had theoretically expanded the defense through its due process dicta. See note 66
infra. Due process was not pursued, however, in the cited cases.
41. 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded for reconsiderationin light of Russell, 412 U.S. 936 (1973). On remand, the Seventh Circuit determined that Russell controlled and reinstated the conviction. United States v. McGrath, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974).
42. 468 F.2d at 1028.
43. Under the Russell rationale, the printing press furnished in McGrath could have been regarded as harmless and legally obtainable,
merely "something of value." Certainly a printing press is more readily
available than paper and ink suitable for counterfeiting. Moreover, the
delivery of the bills to defendants arguably was only incidental government conduct. McGrath was less a "furnishing contraband" than a "government involvement" case. See authorities cited in notes 25-29 supra.
44. 490 F.2d at 164 n.7.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:444

tions have competed for priority since the inception of the en%rapment doctrine, each stressing a different policy choice. In
adopting a limited role for the courts, and in focusing on predisposition, the Russell majority emphasized a need for flexible
means of detecting undercover crime. Consequently, innocent
persons might be afforded only an after-the-fact remedy, a defense in a court of law. Furthermore, otherwise intolerable police behavior might receive judicial condonation merely because
that behavior is directed against a "predisposed" individual. 45
On the other hand, in assuming it appropriate that the courts
review police practices, the minority position has emphasized a
need for fairness and for protecting innocent persons from abusive police tactics in the first instance-on the streets. Commentators have argued that no one test will suffice, but that different crimes merit different resolutions of these conflicting policies. 46 In this respect, Justice Frankfurter suggested that judicial rules guidirg police conduct should take into consideration
a number of different factors:
Evidence of the setting in which the inducement took place...
the nature of the crime involved, its secrecy and difficulty of
detection, and the manner in which the particular criminal business is usually carried on. 47

Applying these considerations, narcotics sales cases such as
Oquendo and Bueno are distinguishable from Russell and McGrath in three major ways: first, the nature of the instigating
government agent; second, the complexity of the crimes and the
detection problems they create for the police; and third, the probability of innocent persons being instigated to commit crimes,
48
if police tactics are left uncontrolled.
In regard to the first two distinctions, the undercover instigators in Russell and McGrath were full-time, professional
45. See notes 66-67 infra and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent [sic] Provocateurs,60 YAmE L.J. 1091, 1113-15 (1951);
Rotenberg, suvra note 8, at 625-34.
47. 356 U.S. at 384-85. Russell also can be read to suggest such
an approach. Justice Rehnquist stated that:
The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a continuing ... business enterprise....
[T]he gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct frequently
proves to be an all but impossible task. . . . [O]ne of the only
practicable means of detection [is] the infiltration of drug rings
and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices.
411 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
48. This Comment focuses primarily on entrapment through the
furnishing of narcotics, and these distinctions may be unique to narcotics
sales cases; the government's furnishing of other contraband, such as
counterfeit bills or weapons, may raise other considerations.
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agents employed by the federal government. 49 Their tasks were
complex, in that multiple suspects were involved in manufacturing illegal drugs. Infiltration was necessary, and as the Russell
majority concluded, a fiat rule prohibiting the provision of
"something of value" to these operations could well have beeri
fatal to the process of detection. 0 By contrast, the instigating
agents in Oquendo and Bueno were informers-part-time, unofficial employees of the government who were paid on a contingent-fee basis."1 Their tasks were relatively simple since their
targets were isolated individuals. The informers were also addicts, and to sustain their addictions, they needed to induce other
52
addicts to sell heroin to official undercover agents.
49. In Russell, the instigator was an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 411 U.S. at 425; in McGrath, the undercover agents were employed by the Secret Service, 468
F.2d at 1028.
50. 411 U.S. at 432. But see note 43 supra.
51. The use of informers is an accepted, multinational law enforcement practice, see, e.g., Miers, Informers and Agents Provocateurs, 120
Nzw L.J. 577 (1970), and a method of detecting undercover crime considered indispensable by law enforcement personnel. One commentator
estimates that 95 percent of all federal narcotics cases result from the
efforts of informers. Williams, supra note 8, at 402-04. Notwithstanding
the need for informers, the possibilities for abusive practices in their use
are legion. See generally Donnelly, supra note 46; Rotenberg, supra note
8; Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practiceof Encouragement, 49 VA. L.
REv. 871 (1963).

Oquendo sought to raise a second entrapment issue on the basis of
the informer's contingent-fee arrangement. Although he failed to raise
this issue at trial, he argued on appeal that FED. R. CaUi. P. 52(b) required the Court to examine the informer's contingent-fee arrangement
as an independent basis for acquittal. 490 F.2d at 166 n.11. He relied
on Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), which requires the prosecution to explain the appropriateness of any contingentfee agreement to produce evidence against particular named defendants
as to crimes not yet committed. Williamson was not compelling authority, however, as it had been substantially diluted by the Fifth Circuit itself, see, e.g., Hill v. United States, 328 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 851 (1964); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5th
Cir. 1965), and no other circuit had expressly followed it. See, e.g.,
United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1971); Annot., 13 A.L.R.
Fed. 905 (1972). The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), had further clouded the viability of Williamso,
see note 34 supra, and, in any event, the informer's agreement in the
instant case had not been predicated on apprehension of a specific,
named individual. Brief for Appellee at 14. The court of appeals declined to consider Oquendo's argument. 490 F.2d at 166 n.1l.
52. Judge Edward J. Weinfeld commented on the motives of an informer as follows:
Since the informer was to be paid only in those cases wherein
his efforts were successful, and his livelihood was dependent
upon the funds derived from his activities, he had every motive
to induce the commission of the offense charged to this defend-
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With respect to the third distinction, the potential for abuse
in an informer system, if no controls are imposed, 53 is considerable. In United States v. Silva, 4 a 1959 case in which the "furishing contraband" defense began to emerge in the federal
courts, the district court found no evidence that Silva had had
any prior association with narcotics. Instead, Silva testified, a
contingent-fee informer introduced him to heroin free of charge,
began to exact payment, and ultimately took advantage of his addiction by offering him a "fix" in return for delivering heroin
to the arresting agent. 55 District Judge Weinfeld evinced little
regard for the informer's integrity, stating:
In the exercise of restraint and moderation, and bearing in mind
that perhaps at times the use of informers is required in fighting
the evils of the illegal drug activities, I shall not characterize
the informer's testimony further than to say it not only abounds
in substantial and material contradictions
but is utterly unre56
liable, untrustworthy and undependable.

An informer's motives, the ease with which he can introduce narcotics into the marketplace, and the absence of clear rules or
standards to guide his activities all create an obvious danger to
innocent persons. This fact becomes particularly clear when the
nature of the "innocent" person likely to be a target is considered.
Informers function among persons particularly vulnerable to offers of narcotics, including not only dealers and occasional users,
but also addicts and persons attempting to quit. The majority
approach to entrapment is frequently criticized by commentaant, who was in desperate need to satisfy his drug habit which
resulted from his initiation by the informer.
United States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
53. The absence of controls such as probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or fixed rules against certain practices is a normal characteristic
of the informer's environment. See Rotenberg, supra note 8, at 617-29.
54. 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
55. Id. at 558.
56. Id. at 559. Finding no predisposition, Judge Weinfeld granted
Silva's motion for acquittal.
The Southern District of New York was also the first federal court
to articulate a defense approaching a per se rule against furnishing contraband. United States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
barred the prosecution of a defendant who, needing money for rent,
agreed to deliver cocaine for an informer he knew as a narcotics dealer.
The court held that the government had failed to prove that the drugs
were not supplied by the informer, and thereby failed to prove that it
had not created the disposition to commit the offense. In that case, District Judge Motley found that "an atrociously wicked new profession is
emerging in the enforcement of our narcotics laws, i.e., the simultaneous
seller-informer." Id. at 986 (emphasis added). Judge Motley was referring to a tendency of some contingent-fee informers to supplement
their incomes by profiting from the sales of narcotics to their targets.
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tors 57 and is rejected by several proposed criminal codes5 s not

only because innocent persons are potentially subject to abusive
police tactics under that approach, but also because such persons
with questionable backgrounds-even if innocent-are especially
susceptible to conviction. 59 Even an acquittal, however, would
scarcely be solace for one such as Silva, whose addiction was conceived of and hastened by a government agent. In contrast to
the limited remedy the majority affords innocent, but vulnerable
persons, per se rules developed under Justice Frankfurter's rationale would in the first instance discourage the government
from serving as a tempter of the weak-willed. 60
A per se "rule" against furnishing contraband, such as that
proposed in Oquendo, would serve to minimize potentially abusive crime detection in two ways. First, it would cause the police
to exercise greater precautions and to assert greater control over
informers in their charge. Second, it would deprive informers
of a motivation to deal in or distribute contraband, because their
fees would be contingent on the use of more conventional means
of encouragement. Moreover, the "furnishing contraband" tactic lacks the element of necessity that has historically been the
basis for rationalizing government involvement in the commission of undercover crimes.61 Thus, in Lewis v. United States,62
the Supreme Court held "deception" a "necessity" for purposes
of revealing unlawful activities. 63 Under this rationale, the conventionally available tactic of offering to purchase contraband
arguably can be justified as essential for exposing persons otherwise willing to sell. To show further that the provision of con57. See authorities cited in note 8 supra.
58. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1) (b) (Proposed Official Draft,

1962);

NATIONAL COIVMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,

A PROPOSED NEw FEDERAL CRamiNAL CODE § 702 (1971).
59.

Once the defendant raises the defense of entrapment, the ma-

jority approach permits the introduction of evidence not necessarily
bearing on his present criminal inclinations. This may include hearsay
evidence regarding his reputation, character, and criminal activities generally, as well as evidence of past convictions and the degree of reticence, or lack thereof, he exhibited in response to the government's instigation. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 46, at 1108; Mikell, supra note
8, at 252; Note, supra note 16, at 1339.
60. No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in
the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him
into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
61. See generally authorities cited in note 8 supra.
62. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
63. Id. at 208-09.
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traband is a necessity in certain circumstances, it can perhaps
be asserted that where a suspect does not presently possess contraband, neither an arrest nor a search nor even an offer to purchase is a viable police tactic. By furnishing contraband in such
a case and following with an immediate arrest, the government
can prevent commission of future crimes.6 4 This argument, however, leaves even the most innocent persons vulnerable to manipulation by the government. If a person is in fact predisposed
to possess or distribute contraband, he ordinarily will be able
to obtain it himself; if not, little purpose would be served by
his conviction. Expediency appears to be the only advantage
supporting the government's provision of contraband, and expediency alone does not appear sufficient to justify the use of
otherwise unnecessary police practices by either informers or official government agents.65 Were there not other alternatives,
a different conclusion might be reached; as evidenced by Russell
and Lewis, however, undercover crime detection does not suffer
for want of permissible police practices.
With respect to present entrapment doctrine, Oquendo
demonstrates that the pre-Russell division among the lower federal courts continues. Although the Russell majority may have
intended to narrowly circumscribe the power of the courts over
this defense, the Oquendo decision is evidence that it has not
completely succeeded. Exercising an asserted power to condemn
a particular police practice, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit departed from and went beyond the Supreme Court's re64. This is, of course, a standard justification of a need for government instigation, here extended to include provision of contraband. See,
e.g., Rotenberg, supra note 8, at 625.

65. While it may be concluded as a matter of policy that tight con-

trols over informers are especially appropriate, it does not follow that
reprehensible tactics of official government agents should be countenanced. The ultimate concern is not the specific status of the agent but
the conduct of the government itself and the tactics it employs. See,
e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal.
1970) (official government agent supplying counterfeit bills).
With respect to expediency, Justice Stewart questioned its sufficiency as a basis for instigation in Russell, asking:
If the chemical was so easily available elsewhere, then
why did not the agent simply wait until the respondent had
himself obtained the ingredients and produced the drug, and
then buy it from him?
411 U.S. at 448-49.
This reasoning seems to apply a fortiori to the instant case in which
the instigating agent was an informer, there was but one suspect, and
the "wait" between anticipated sales would have been more brief than
the wait for a substantial quantity of a manufactured product.
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affirmation of the Sorrells-Sherman statutory construction rationale, refusing, as a matter of policy, to condone the furnishing
of contraband. The Fifth Circuit reached a result, however, that
is not necessarily inconsistent with the position of the Supreme
Court. Although Russell renders the supervisory power rationale a less than viable basis for Oquendo, that Supreme Court
decision also suggests that where police practices are sufficiently
egregious, defendants such as Oquendo can also challenge police
conduct on grounds transcending the narrow confines of traditional entrapment doctrine. Dicta in Russell suggests the availability of due process as a basis for judicial condemnation of certain abusive police practices, and perhaps the policy bases of a
rule against furnishing contraband may be so substantial as to
support such a due process defense. 66 Arguably, it is funda66. Oquendo did not argue that due process of law mandated his
acquittal. However, due process might prove to be an alternate foundation for a rule against furnishing contraband. While the Supreme Court
rejected a supervisory power approach to entrapment in both Sherman
and Russell, the latter opinion explicitly left open the possibility that
certain police conduct might be so outrageous as to impel the Court to
bar prosecution on due process grounds. Justice Rehnquist stated that
police conduct so "shocking to the universal sense of justice" as to violate the standard of "fundamental fairness" would justify such a result.
411 U.S. at 432. In propounding this standard, the Justice expressed an
aversion to the "notion that due process of law can be embodied in fixed
rules," and thus rejected a rule of due process prorosed by Russell that
would have prohibited the government from furnishing an "indispensable means" for commission of a crime. Id. at 431. Justice Rehnquist's
own opinion may undercut this reluctance to countenance fixed rules,
however, because it distinguished the ingredient furnished Russell from
contraband, characterizing it as a "harmless substance" and determining
that its possession was legal. Id. at 431-32.
As a result of this ambiguity, it is difficult to predict what police
conduct might be found violative of due process. This difficulty is compounded by Justice Rehnquist's unexplained citation to Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where police in search of morphine committed an unlawful entry and pumped defendant's stomach to obtain the
incriminating evidence. Id. at 166-67.
If the Russell Court's aversion to fixed rules was a response solely
to the rule proposed in that case, if Rochin does not represent the Court's
threshold test for due process violations, and if the Court were to take
the position that police practices can only be justified where necessary
for the detection of undercover crime, then a rule against contraband
could assume constitutional dimensions. As to the latter, necessity is
arguably the thrust of both Russell and Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206 (1966), which held that certain deceitful police practices are
permissible. Cf. Comment, supra note 34, at 252.
At this time, the courts of appeals have not directly confronted the
due process question in the contraband context. However, an issue of
police misconduct was framed as a due process question and left to the
jury in United States v. Anderson, Crim. No. 602-71 (D.N.J. May 20,
1973), see Note, supra note 24, at 386. In dictum, moreover, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has suggested that the furnishing of

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:444

mentally unfair for the "government [to] suppl[y] the contraband, the receipt of which is illegal ... [and] be permitted to
punish the one receiving it."' 6 7 Regardless of the legal foundation
on which the rule against furnishing contraband rests, however,
it is so firmly rooted in policy as to explain the Fifth Circuit's
present determination to restrict Russell to its facts.

contraband is sufficiently overreaching to violate due process as a matter
of law, stating:
If, as Johnson testified, the informer provided the heroin which
was sold to the undercover agent, we think the government
would have been perilously close to what Justice Rehnquist conceived in [Russell] as conduct so outrageous as to violate standards of due process.
United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
added).
67. United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (C.D. Cal.
1970).

